The recent UK Supreme Court and Privy Council (JCPC) decision in Jogee and Ruddock  UKSC 8;  UKPC 7 has generated considerable comment on the substantive issues, most of it (at least cautiously) welcoming. The case concerned criminal liability for a ‘joint enterprise’ – a particular form of accessory liability that has long been viewed as a problematic feature of numerous criminal prosecutions, including in high profile cases such as the 1952 murder conviction of Derek Bentley (who was posthumously pardoned) and the more recent convictions of Gary Dobson and David Norris for the murder of Stephen Lawrence. The Courts’ decision overturns what appeared to be settled law in England and Jamaica, leading to the prospect of an uncertain number of reviews of prior convictions, and to possible ramifications for other common law jurisdictions. There has, however, been little reference to some interesting features of the case from the more general perspective of ‘legal methods’, which is what I intend to address in this post.
Procedurally, this is clearly a landmark case in that it is the first time that the UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council have sat together to hear joined appeals from a UK and a Commonwealth case. Joinder of appeals is, of course, structurally quite feasible, given that the Supreme Court Justices also constitute the backbone of the Privy Council bench, and the courts share a common infrastructure as well. Nonetheless, it is, so far as I can tell, unprecedented – at least in the ‘modern’ era since the jurisdiction of the two courts was settled by the Judicature Acts and the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 (I would be happy to be put right on this if anyone knows differently).
Interestingly, the judgment itself makes no reference to the novelty of the procedure, nor highlights any authority for conjoining appeals across the two courts’ jurisdictions. As there is nothing express in the Rules of either court, or in their respective Practice Directions, I think we must assume that the power resides in the courts’ inherent jurisdiction to determine their own procedure (note r. 9 of both the Supreme Court Rules 2009, and the Judicial Committee (Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules 2009).
Implications for precedent in England and Wales
Over the years a number of cases have arisen where issues have been decided within the jurisdiction of the Privy Council that would, had they been decided by the House of Lords/Supreme Court, have created a binding (rather than persuasive) precedent in English common law. Divergence of this sort has occasionally caused problems for the Court of Appeal and lower courts, who have found themselves confronted by conflicting House of Lords or Court of Appeal and JCPC decisions. The close relationship between the Supreme Court and JCPC has sometimes been used to enable English courts to take a flexible approach to JCPC precedents, blurring the persuasive/binding distinction, as when following Attorney General for Jersey v Holley  UKPC 23 (where an exceptional nine-judge Board of the JCPC was convened specifically to clarify the common law on provocation – see, eg, the discussion in Holland & Webb, Learning Legal Rules, 8th ed, Oxford UP, p.171). The ability to join cases in the manner of Jogee and Ruddock obviously provides a further mechanism for preventing the niceties of stare decisis from getting in the way of a good (common) solution. However, it is, of course, a very limited innovation. It is fairly unlikely that the factual circumstances will often arise to make joined appeals possible. Consequently it probably does little to reduce the need for continuing judicial flexibility a la Holley
Impact in Australia
The decision may shortly have important ramifications in Australia. The history of the doctrine of extended common purpose reflects an interesting interplay of common law principles from a range of jurisdictions. The rulings by the Privy Council in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen  AC 168 and the House of Lords in R v Powell, R v English  1 AC 1, both overturned by Jogee and Ruddock, built substantially on decisions of Australia’s High Court in the 1980s. Moreover, in an interesting flow of authorities, the High Court in turn relied on Chan in McAuliffe v R  HCA 37, to reach the same conclusion on extended common purpose as the House of Lords in 1999. Crucially, the High Court is due to hear argument next month in an appeal on ‘joint enterprise’ from the South Australian Supreme Court’s decision in R v Presley, Miller & Smith  SASCFC 53. It is notable that the doctrine was last considered by the High Court as recently as 2006, when – following argument before the full Court – it refused leave to appeal in Clayton v R  HCA 58 (Kirby J dissenting) . That Presley, Miller and Smith were not similarly rejected may be, in a sense, fortuitous. The case raises issues of intoxication not considered in McAuliffe or Clayton, and it is clear from the transcripts that the High Court was only willing to grant special leave on this ground, and would not re-open the debate about extended common purpose more generally – see eg Presley v Director of Public Prosecutions for the State of South Australia  HCATrans 17 (12 February 2016).
The timing of Jogee and Ruddock thus proves interesting, to say the least. The Supreme Court/Privy Council were clear in their unanimous view that, on a proper reading, the earlier Australian jurisprudence (in Johns  HCA 3 and Miller (1980) 55 ALJR 23) did not justify the wrong turn taken by the JCPC in Chan (see para 67). In this light, will the High Court of Australia stick to its McAuliffe guns? The Court has been quite robust in carving-out a distinctive Australian ‘common law’, so it may not be fazed by the prospect of maintaing its own settled jurisprudence, despite continuing controversy over the operation of joint enterprise laws. At the same time, it by no means ignores the decisions of the UK Supreme Court/Privy Council. For the present we must wait and see.